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1

ARGUMENT
I.

The Arbitration Award Should Be Set Aside Because the
Arbitrator Relied on Fraudulent Evidence of the Fair
Market Value of the Subject Property.
Arbitration is a speedy and inexpensive method of

resolving disputes.

Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v.

Fake, 740 P. 2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987) (citing Robinson & Wells.
P. C. v. Warren. 669 P. 2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983)).

As a general

rule, however, an arbitration award may be set aside for fraud,
improper conduct or unfair means used in procuring the award.
See Teal v. Bilbv. 123 U.S. 572 (1887) (fraudulent concealment
of facts); Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, What Constitutes
Corruption, Fraud, or Undue Means in Obtaining Arbitration Award
Justifying Avoidance of Award Under State Law, 22 A. L. R. 4th
366, 377-81 (1983).

In the present case, the arbitration award

cannot stand because the proceeding was not fair and honest and
because the substantial rights of the parties have not been
respected.

See Utility Trailer, 740 P. 2d at 1329.
In his Appellee' s Brief, Mintz argues that Marc

Development somehow waived its right to challenge the
arbitrator' s decision by failing to file a motion to set aside
the award within twenty days after the award was issued.
Brief p. 12)

(Mintz

The basis for Marc Development's motion to set the

award aside, however, was new information that the award had
been procured through fraud.

A.

Marc Development Moved to Set Aside the
Arbitration Award Within the Statutory
Limitations Period.

The Utah Arbitration Act establishes the time frame
within which a motion to vacate an award must be filed.

In

pertinent part, the Act provides:
(1) Upon motion to the court by any
party to the arbitration proceeding for
vacation of the award, the court shall
vacate the award if it appears:
(a) the award was procured by
corruption, fraud, or other undue
means;

(2) A motion to vacate an award shall
be made to the court within 20 days after a
copy of the award is served upon the moving
party, or if predicated upon corruption,
fraud, or other undue means, within 20 days
after the grounds are known or should have
been known.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14 (1992) (emphasis supplied).
Marc Development discovered that the arbitration
proceeding was defective shortly after Mintz filed his Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings.

Marc Development filed its

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Objection
to Judgment on the Pleadings on February 4, 1992, well within
the limitations period imposed by § 78-31a-14(2).
64)
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(See R. 36-

B.

Marc Development has Marshalled the Evidence
Demonstrating that the Case Should Be Remanded
for Further Proceedings.

Mintz argues that Marc Development has failed to
marshal any evidence in support of its claims.
p. 16)

(Mintz Brief

This argument is without any substance because the trial

court refused to allow Marc Development an opportunity to
present evidence in support of its claim of fraud.

The essence

of Marc Development' s argument is that the trial court refused
to grant an opportunity for Marc Development to establish these
critical facts on the record.
The record is clear, however, that Marc development
presented new evidence suggesting that the arbitration award had
been procured through fraud.

(R. 3 6-77)

The record is equally

clear that the trial court refused to hear this evidence.
(R. 122-60)
The trial court' s summary disposition of this matter
placed Marc Development in the same position of a litigant
opposing a motion for summary judgment before discovery was
commenced.

Marc Development had only recently learned of facts

that indicated the arbitrator' s award was defective.

After

Mintz brought his action to confirm the award, Marc Development
was forced to present all available evidence to the court.
After raising these material issues, Marc Development should
have been allowed to complete its investigation of the facts and
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to present the results of that investigation to the court.

The

Utah Arbitration Act was never intended to foreclose all
possibility of discovery to confirm or disprove whether an
arbitration award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means.
C.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-14(1).
Marc Development Presented Evidence That the
Arbitration Award Had Been Procured Through
Fraud.

An arbitral award will not be enforced if it was
procured by fraud or coercion.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-3la-

14(l)(a); Office and Professional Employees International Union,
Local 2 v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 724
F. 2d 133 (D. C. Cir. 1983).

The burden of showing fraud

sufficient to set aside an arbitration award is on the party
seeking to set the award aside.

Keen v. IFG Leasing Co. . 622

P. 2d 861 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).

The party bearing this burden

must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration
award was obtained by fraud.

Hot Springs County School District

No. 1 v. Strube Const. Co. . 715 P. 2d 540 (Wyo. 1986).

It is

axiomatic that clear and convincing evidence cannot be presented
without an opportunity to conduct discovery or to examine live
witnesses.
As set forth in its Memorandum in Support of its
Objection to Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 36-64), Marc
Development learned that on at least two occasions, Mintz
-4-

solicited bids from individuals on the subject property at
prices substantially below fair market value and offered to
"split the difference" with the bidding individual between the
offered purchase price and the guarantee.

The arbitration award

was defective because the arbitrator actually relied on this
false and deceptive evidence to establish the value of the
subject property.

(See R. 53, 58)

Marc Development also

learned that Mintz may have been involved in a scheme to tie up
assets of Marc Development so that the subject property could
not be repurchased from Mintz.

All of these events were

discovered after the arbitrator' s award had been entered.
Mintz argues that there is no evidence in the record
to support Marc Development' s claim of fraud.
p. 17)

(Mintz Brief

Marc Development did, however, present evidence that the

arbitrator' s award had been procured by the submission of
deceptive and defective evidence and that Mintz failed to fairly
and accurately represent the purported offer of $400,000.00 for
the subject property.
In reviewing the granting of a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, the facts and all inferences are reviewed in the
light most favorable to Marc Development.

See Young v. Texas

Co. , 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P. 2d 1099, 1100 (1958).

For purposes of

appellate review, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is
treated as a motion for summary judgment where matters outside
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the pleadings have been presented and not excluded by the court.
Id.; see also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983)
("Doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact properly
presented, or the nature of inferences to be drawn from the
facts, are to be construed in a light favorable to the party
opposing the summary judgment.").
The record reveals that on February 4, 1992, Marc
Development filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of its Objection to Judgment on the Pleadings.
(R. 36-64)

The Memorandum was supported by the Affidavit of

Mark Kaplan (R. 65-73) and the Affidavit of Jon Olch. (R. 74-77)
The Kaplan Affidavit established that on at least two separate
occasions, Mintz solicited bids on the subject property at
prices substantially below the fair market value of the
property.

(R. 71)

Mintz sought bids from Peter Arnold and

James Schwartz and offered to "split the difference" with the
bidding party between the offered price and the guarantee.
71)

(R.

The Kaplan Affidavit also established that Mintz had listed

the subject property for sale for $588,500.00 but had refused to
sell it to Marc Development in order to satisfy the guarantee.
(R. 71)
The Affidavit of Jon Olch established that Mintz
listed and sold the subject property for an amount significantly
greater than the value attributed to the property by the
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arbitrator.

Olch is a licensed real estate agent employed with

Prudential Coleman Real Estate, the selling broker for the
subject property.

(R. 74)

The Olch Affidavit established that

Mintz had entered into a binding sale agreement with Mr. and
Mrs. Carmela J. Santoro, as Trustees of the Santoro Family
Trust, for the purchase and sale of the subject property for
$570,000,000.

(R. 75)

The property was listed at $588,500.00

and the buyer originally offered $560,000.00 for the property.
(R. 75)
In order to defeat the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, Marc Development was required only to present
evidence sufficient to raise an issue of fact as to whether the
arbitration award had been procured through fraud.

The Kaplan

and Olch Affidavits raised issues of fact which, if proved,
would serve as a basis for setting the arbitration award aside.
Marc Development was never allowed an opportunity to prove these
facts or even to conduct a complete investigation into the
matter.

Because the evidence went to the very heart of the

arbitrator' s ruling, the trial court erred in refusing to allow
Marc Development an opportunity to present this evidence at an
evidentiary hearing.
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D.

Marc Development Was Denied a Meaningful
Opportunity to Present Evidence that the
Arbitration Award Was Defective.

Marc Development filed a request for oral argument on
February 28, 1992.

(R. 115-6)

The trial court, however,

refused this request and granted Mintz' s motion for judgment on
the pleadings in a minute entry dated March 24, 1992. (R. 152)
The trial court entered its formal Order and Judgment confirming
the arbitration award on March 25, 1992. (R. 153-6)

The trial

court entered an Order and Supplemental Judgment on March 2 5,
1992 awarding attorneys' fees and costs.

(R. 157-60)

Marc

Development was never allowed an opportunity to present its
argument and evidence to the court.
The Kaplan and Olch Affidavits were offered to show
only that the arbitration award should not be confirmed because
the award had been procured through fraud.

An offer to show

fraud in attacking arbitration award should indicate facts
which, if proved, would be sufficient to sustain such a finding.
Parking Unlimited, Inc. v. Monsour Medical Foundation. 445 A. 2d
758, 762 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).

The Affidavits indicated the

existence of material issues of disputed facts.

The Affidavits

themselves were never intended to be a substitute for live
testimony.

The trial court should have granted an evidentiary

hearing to allow Marc Development to call live witnesses, such
as Mintz, Peter Arnold and James Schwartz, to conclusively
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establish or disprove these facts.

See Malibu Pools of New

Mexico. Inc. v. Harvard. 637 P. 2d 537 (N. M. 1981) (trial court
erred in refusing to hear evidence of arbitration panel' s
alleged misconduct for failure to hear evidence).

Only after

hearing this evidence, the trial court could then confirm or set
aside the arbitration award.

To confirm the award without

hearing the evidence, however, frustrates the essential purposes
of arbitration.
An evidentiary hearing would not, of course, be for
the purpose of retrying the issues before the arbitrator.

The

hearing would be for the sole purpose of determining whether the
arbitration award was defective because of the reliance by the
arbitrator on false and deceptive evidence.
The trial court erred in granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings because the Kaplan and Olch Affidavits
submitted in opposition to the motion created a material issue
of fact as to whether Mintz obtained the arbitration award
through fraud.

See American Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead,

751 P. 2d 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
rebut these affidavits.

Mintz offered no evidence to

The trial court erred in failing to

hold an evidentiary hearing to allow Marc Development to call
live witnesses to establish these facts.
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E.

The Trial Court Failed to Enter a Written
Statement of the Ground for its Decision as
Required bv Rule 52.

Because the confirmation of the arbitration award had
the same effect as the grant of a motion for summary judgment
under Rule 5 6, the trial court was required to enter a written
statement of the ground for its decision in accordance with Rule
52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Clawson v. Habilitat. Inc. .

783 P. 2d 1230 (Hawaii 1989) (findings of fact and conclusions of
law should be entered by the trial court on motions to vacate
arbitration awards); Utah R. Civ. P. 52.

Without a statement of

findings of fact and conclusions of law, this Court is unable to
determine whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to
vacate.

See Clawson, 783 P. 2d at 1232.

Indeed, this Court is

unable even to determine whether the trial court was aware of
the new evidence presented by Marc Development.
In pertinent part, Rule 52 states as follows:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory
jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A
. . . . The trial court need not enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law in
ruling on motions, except as provided in
Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue
a brief written statement of the ground for
its decision on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
-10-

Because Marc Development raised issues of fact outside
the pleadings, the motion to confirm the arbitration award is
viewed as a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Texas Co. , 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P. 2d 1099, 1100 (1958).

Young v.
The trial

court failed to enter a written statement of the ground for its
decision.

This failure is critical because it effectively

denies Marc Development of the right to seek meaningful judicial
review of the trial court' s decision.
II.

Mintz Has Obtained a Double Recovery as a Result of
the Arbitration Award.
After persuading the arbitrator that the fair market

value of the subject property was only $400,000.00, Mintz listed
the subject property for sale at $588,500.00.

(R. 75)

Mintz

ultimately accepted an offer of $570,000.00 for the property.
(R. 75)

Mintz now seeks to again recover the difference between

the $400,000.00 value established by the arbitrator and the
$588,500.00 guarantee.

Mintz has already been compensated for

any loss suffered and to permit the enforcement of the
arbitration award would result in an improper windfall to Mintz.
See Briaham City Sand & Gravel Machinery Center. Inc. . 613 P. 2d
510, 511 (Utah 1980) (a party may not obtain a double recovery
for the same loss).
Evidence of the actual sales price of the subject
property is important only as it relates to the arbitration
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award.

The listing of the subject property at the guarantee and

the eventual sale of the property for less than four percent
under the listing price serve to demonstrate that the arbitrator
relied on defective evidence in fixing the value of the property
at $400,000.00.

Marc Development has explained how the

arbitrator was misled by false evidence manufactured by Mintz in
an attempt to deceive the arbitrator.
III.

The District Court Should Determine the Actual Amount
of Damages Suffered bv Mintz.
As it presently stands, the arbitration award allows

Mintz $188,500.00 in damages plus interest and fees.

This

amount represents the guaranteed price of $588,500.00 less the
$400,000.00 "fair market value" of the property as determined by
the arbitrator.

The evidence, however, shows that Mintz may

have suffered as little as $18,500.00 in actual damages after
the subject property was sold.

The actual damages are

calculated by subtracting the $570,000,00 actual sales price of
the subject property from the $588,500.00 guarantee price.
Because of the obvious and wide discrepancy between the actual
damages suffered by Mintz and the amount of the arbitration
award, the case should be remanded to the district court for a
determination of the actual damages suffered by Mintz.
The actual damages suffered by Mintz were established
during January, 1992 when Mintz agreed to sell the subject
property for $570,000.00.

(See R. 75)
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Thus, the actual damages

suffered by Mintz were established within eight months of the
arbitration award and before the award was confirmed by the
district court.
Because the subject property has been sold, and the
amount of the damages actually suffered by Mintz can be fixed
with precision, the district court should hear evidence of the
actual damages suffered by Mintz.

The amount of damages awarded

by the arbitrator were based upon inaccurate estimates and
conjecture as to the actual value of the property.

To allow the

arbitration award to stand would ignore the realities of the
case and would unfairly penalize Marc Development.

Conversely,

a redetermination of the damages actually suffered by Mintz
would fairly compensate Mintz and would preserve the essential
determination of the arbitrator.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Marc Development respectfully
requests that the decision of the district court be reversed and
the case remanded with instructions to hold an evidentiary
hearing to allow Marc Development to present evidence on its
claim that the arbitration award was procured through the use of
fraudulent evidence and to determine the exact nature and extent
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of the damages suffered by Mintz.
DATED this Z/7/^

day of November, 1992.
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(801) 532-3333
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